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Abstract
This article attempts to relativise the nationalism of Chinese-speaking Muslims, which 
has tended to be overemphasised in previous studies, focusing on a movement in which 
Muslims in North China cut off their braids or queues––Manchu men’s traditional hair-
style imposed on Chinese people under the Qing rule––and related debates among the 
Muslim elite before and after the Xinhai Revolution. Unlike some Chinese men who 
cut off their braids for patriotic reasons or anti-Manchu sentiment, Muslims did so for 
religious reasons, arguing that Islam forbids queues because they look like the tail of a 
pig, an animal considered to be unclean in their religion. It is notable that some Muslims 
simply followed the social trend among the majority and cut off their queues, while a 
young Muslim scholar in Tianjin chose not to do so to prevent conflicts among Muslims 
and save face. This study thus illustrates the complex and diverse opinions of Muslims at 
that time, which cannot be completely explained by patriotism or piety.  
Keywords: Chinese Muslims, queue (hairstyle), Xinhai Revolution, North China, 
nationalism
Rezanje kit za vero, ohranjanje kit zaradi ugleda: Gibanje za rezanje kit kita-
jskih muslimanov v severni Kitajski v obdobju revolucije Xinhai
Izvleček
Članek poskuša relativizirati nacionalizem kitajsko govorečih muslimanov, ki je bil v 
prejšnjih študijah tako zelo poudarjen, tako da se osredotoča na gibanje, v katerem so si 
muslimani v severni Kitajski rezali svoje pletenice ali kite – tradicionalno pričesko man-
džurskih moških, vsiljeno kitajskemu ljudstvu pod vladavino Qing – in s tem povezane 
razprave med muslimansko elito pred revolucijo Xinhai in po njej. V nasprotju z nekaterimi 
kitajskimi moškimi, ki so si kite odrezali zaradi patriotskih razlogov ali protimandžurskih 
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občutkov, so muslimani to storili iz verskih razlogov, saj so menili, da islam prepoveduje 
kite, ker so videti kot rep prašiča, živali, ki v njihovi religiji velja za nečisto. Izpostaviti 
velja, da so si nekateri muslimani kite odrezali preprosto zato, ker so sledili družbenim 
smernicam, medtem ko se je vpliven mladi muslimanski učenjak v Tianjinu odločil, da 
tega ne bo storil, s čimer je hotel preprečiti konflikt med muslimani in rešiti svoj ugled. 
Obravnavana študija tako prikaže večplastna in raznovrstna mnenja muslimanov v tistem 
času, ki jih patriotizem ali pobožnost ne moreta popolnoma pojasniti.
Ključne besede: kitajski muslimani, kite (frizura), revolucija Xinhai, Severna Kitajska, 
nacionalizem
Nationalism, Hairstyle, and Faith
Earlier research on the modern history of Chinese-speaking Muslims1 has ex-
clusively concentrated on how the Muslim elite sought to accommodate their 
religious identity within their national identity and expressed patriotism for the 
Chinese nation. Scholars have emphasised the importance of Muslim reformists’ 
“survival strategies” (Matsumoto 2003), and “efforts for national integration” (ibid. 
2006, 139), examining how they “strove to be patriotic and nationalistic” (ibid., 
118) and “implemented the Islamic revival movement in order to coexist with the 
other ethnicities” (ibid., 138).2 Some researchers even romanticise Muslims’ “con-
tribution” (Ch. gongxian 貢献) to the Chinese nation3, and present an overwhelm-
ing emphasis on the “patriotic” and “pious”4 qualities of Muslims, frequently citing 
the slogan “aiguo aijiao 愛國愛教” (“to love one’s homeland is to love faith”) which 
derived from the Arabic saying “hׅubb al-watׅan min al-īmān” (“love for the home-
land is part of faith”) first spread by Islamic reformists in the Middle East (ibid., 
126). However, nationalism was not the sole characteristic of Chinese-speaking 
Muslims in the early twentieth century. To reconsider Muslims’ patriotism, this 
study looks at the example of queue-cutting, which is often regarded as evidence 
of Chinese people’s patriotic behaviour and anti-Qing sentiment.
1 Chinese-speaking Muslims in this article are roughly equivalent to present-day Huizu 回族, one 
of the ethnic minorities in the People’s Republic of China, who are said to be the descendants of 
Arab, Persian, and Turkic Muslims who had visited China and intermarried with local people.
2 As for the Islamic revival movement in Beijing promoted by a noted Islamic scholar Wang Kuan 
王寛 (or Wang Haoran 王浩然, 1848–1919) and his followers in the early twentieth century, see 
Unno-Yamazaki (2016).
3 For a representative example, which emphasises Muslims’ contributions to the Chinese nation 
during the Xinhai Revolution, see Chen (2011). 
4 For example, Ma (2006) presents how “patriotic” and “pious” Muslim intellectuals in modern Chi-
na, such as Ma Jian 馬堅, tried to reorient and reposition Muslims and Islam by minimising diffe-
rences and maximising commonalities with Han nationalism and socialism during the Republican 
and the Communist regimes.
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As is widely known, a queue (Ch. bianfa 辮髪, or bianzi 辮子) or cue is a male 
hairstyle traditionally worn by certain Eurasian nomads like Jurchens and Man-
chus, where the front and the sides are shaved while the rest of the hair is tied into 
one or two bunches and twisted into a long plait or plaits, worn either at the back 
of the head or one on each side of the head. In the first half of the seventeenth 
century, the Manchus led by Nurhaci (1559–1626), the founder of the Qing Dy-
nasty, and his son and successor Hong Taiji (1592–1643), were gaining ground 
and preparing to conquer China. Under the Manchu rule, some Chinese wore the 
queue style to denote their submission to the new rulers even before the Manchus 
had crossed the Great Wall (Kuhn 1990, 53). Dorgon (1612–50)—fourteenth son 
of Nurhaci and the uncle and regent of Fulin (1638–1661), the first Qing emper-
or to rule over China—first announced the head-shaving policy on June 5, 1644 
(Wakeman 1985, 420). Under the slogan “Keep your head, lose your hair; keep 
your hair, lose your head” (ibid. 1975, 58), the Qing rulers forced people, especially 
Han Chinese, to give up their traditional hairstyles and instead adopt the queue 
as a “measure of a person’s loyalty toward the Qing throne” (Cheng 1998, 128), 
and thus “persecuted hair growers without mercy” (ibid., 125). This requirement 
was met with stubborn resistance and sometimes caused public fear.5 Due to the 
harsh enforcement of the hair-cutting rules, abandoning the queue came to de-
note an expression of rebellion against the Qing.6 Indeed, the queue in China was 
“a fashion to die for” (Metzger 2014, 27) and “a symbol of allegiance to the ruling 
dynasty” (Kuhn 1990, 12). Meanwhile, the Manchu rulers did not issue any equiv-
alent rules about female hairstyles.
Previous studies, which discuss how the queue came to an end in China and the 
overseas Chinese communities in Southeast Asia before and after the Xinhai Rev-
olution, have elucidated the political and social significance of the hairstyle, main-
ly by analysing the anti-Qing/Manchu sentiments and nationalistic discourses of 
the Han Chinese elite (Ryū 1990; Godley 1994; Cheng 1998; Yoshizawa 2003; 
Hou and Hu 2005; Mochida 2012).7 Most of these works emphasise the political 
aspects of the queue-cutting movement among the Chinese people, and link it to 
5 In particular, people in the Jiangnan region between Shanghai and Nanjing fiercely resisted the 
policy (Wakeman 1975, 55–7; Wakeman 1985, 646–50). 
6 The members of the Taiping Rebellion in the late nineteenth century let their hair grow to wear a 
traditional Confucian hairstyle that was different from the Manchu queue. The Qing government 
referred to them in official documents as “long hair rebels” (Ch. changmao zei 長毛賊) or “hair 
traitors” (Ch. fazei 髪賊) (Cheng 1998, 128).
7 Tejapira (1992) focused on the queue hairstyle in Siam (i.e. today’s Thailand) before the early 
twentieth century as an alleged sign of “Chineseness” to examine the genealogy of “Chineseness”, 
asserting that this was a recent invention in Thai racist discourse that had little to do with the 
queue itself.
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modernisation and nationalism. At the same time, Chinese-speaking Muslims, 
who were “perceived as Chinese and had to wear the queue or be punished by 
the same law as other Chinese” (Lipman 2006, 104), were also forced to adopt 
the hairstyle.8 In the early twentieth century, some Chinese-speaking Muslims in 
Beijing and Tianjin, the national capital region and political centre of China, cut 
off their queues one after another, not for reasons of nationalism or modernisa-
tion, but because of their religious faith and the social trends surrounding them. 
By examining Muslims’ disputes over whether the queue was un-Islamic, drawing 
mainly on periodicals published by Chinese-speaking Muslims in North Chi-
na, this study provides a brand-new viewpoint on the queue-cutting movement 
by showcasing the example of Chinese-speaking Muslims and illuminating an 
unknown aspect of the Muslim communities in Beijing and Tianjin in the early 
twentieth century from the perspective of hairstyle and appearance. It will also 
present the interesting example of Chinese-speaking Muslims with regard to the 
links that tie hairstyle and human beings’ bodily expressions, politics, cultures, and 
religious faith. 
It is well known that discussions on queue-cutting were often connected to the 
end of costume changing (Ch. yifu 易服) during the Xinhai Revolution (Yoshiza-
wa 2003, 122, 131–5; Cheng 1998, 132–3). I will not talk about these issues in 
this article, since there is not much said about clothes in Muslims’ discussions over 
queue-cutting. Still, it is interesting that the male Muslim elite in Beijing did not 
seem to pay much attention to women’s foot binding (Ch. chanzu 纏足), which 
was a common practice present in China from the tenth century until it officially 
ended in 1949, and often regarded as problematic in terms of the modernisation of 
the Chinese nation.9 The male Muslims in Beijing and Tianjin who were literate 
enough to write articles in periodicals were more concerned about queue-cutting 
than foot binding. It can be said that the absence of descriptions of foot binding 
in the Muslim media reflects the indifference of the male Muslim elite toward 
women’s issues, as well as the urgency of discussing the topic of queues.
8 On the other hand, Turkic-speaking peoples of the Tarim Basin (roughly equivalent to present-day 
Uyghurs) did not need to wear a queue—except for their leaders, who had to travel to Beijing to pay 
homage to the Manchu emperors (Lipman 2004, 22). Interestingly, some Turkic Muslim officials and 
begs (a local Muslim governor in East Turkestan) in Xinjiang eagerly appealed for the “right to wear 
the queue” so as to show their steadfast loyalty to the Empire (Millward 1998, 215–6).
9 For the origins, purpose, practice, and demise of foot binding in China, see Ko (1997; 2002). Chi-
nese-speaking Muslim women, particularly in the northwest part of China, such as Gansu, had 
practiced foot binding (Hastings et al. 1916, 893). James Legge (1815–97), a Scottish missionary 
and scholar, claimed that in 1881 he came across a placard in a mosque in Canton in southern Chi-
na that denounced foot binding, saying Islam did not allow it since it was a sin against God’s will 
(Legge 1881, 111–2). The Xidaotang 西道堂, a Chinese Islamic sect based in the Northwest China, 
advocated cutting off the queue and opposed the binding of women’s feet (Dillon 1999, 143).
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Muslims’ Queues as Seen by Foreigners
Before examining Muslim polemics over the practice of queue-cutting, I will in-
troduce a perspective on Muslims’ queue hairstyles in Beijing, as seen by two 
foreigners who visited China in the early twentieth century: Marshall Broomhall 
(1866–1937), a British Protestant missionary to China, and Abdürreşid İbrahim 
(1857–1944), a Russian-Tatar journalist who travelled to China in 1909.10 Their 
descriptions are valuable in that they carefully observed and depicted Muslims’ 
hairstyles, which may have been so natural for the Muslims themselves that they 
did not record them.
Broomhall noted the appearance of Chinese-speaking Muslims, and gave par-
ticular attention to their moustaches and hairstyles, writing as follows in his book 
Islam in China:
Reports, emanating from districts as far apart as Kansu, Manchuria, and 
Canton, speak of the habit of clipping the moustache flush with the up-
per lip for the length of the mouth alone, it being allowed to grow at the 
sides as long as it will. This custom is said by themselves to have descend-
ed from Moses, and has the advantage of enabling them to identify one 
another when among strangers. The Mullahs and Ahongs11 in many cas-
es, if not always, shave the entire head, and all conceal the queue during 
worship. (Broomhall 1966, 222)
According to Broomhall, a fellow missionary from Canada named Donald 
MacGillivray also noted the Chinese-speaking Muslims’ queues and caps in 
Shandong during worship at a mosque: “Their queues were carefully tucked 
away under these caps by winding them round the head. The priests and a few 
helpers wound a long piece of white cloth around their caps, and thus made 
very fair turbans”. (ibid., 187–8) In another part of Islam in China, ten Chinese 
Muslim men in Beijing seem to have shaved their heads at around the same 
time (ibid., 242), instead of having queues that they tucked away under their 
caps only during worship. 
The caps referred to here are the skullcaps that Huizu still wear today, which are 
called “worship caps” (Ch. libai mao 禮拜帽) or “Muslim caps” (Ch. Huimin mao 
10 For İbrahim’s trip to China in 1909 and his relations with Chinese-speaking Muslims, see Yamaza-
ki (2014).
11 Ahong is the Chinese transliteration of ākhund, the Persian term for a Muslim cleric or a worship 
leader of a Muslim community. Its Arabic synonym is imām. It is also transliterated as aheng 阿衡 
or ahun 阿渾, and its Chinese synonyms are jiaoshi 教師 and zhangjiao 掌教. For its definition, see 
Wang (2001, 2).
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回民帽).12 Since these caps are not very thick and there is almost no space to 
put something inside them, it must have been rather bothersome for Muslims to 
need to tuck away their queues under these caps. Moreover, since one of the Five 
Pillars in Islam and a mandatory religious duty for every Muslim is to pray five 
times a day, having to put one’s queue under one’s cap would have been a frequent 
annoyance. Abdürreşid İbrahim, who also looked at Chinese-speaking Muslims’ 
worship during his stay in Beijing, noticed that Muslims tucked the queues in 
their caps during the service. He recorded that, while worshipping (Pe. namāz), 
the Chinese people (Ot. Çînliler, i.e. Chinese-speaking Muslims) wore caps simi-
lar to Bukhara caps instead of turbans, that they put their long hair into the caps, 
and that they wore these caps only in mosques and always let their hair hang free 
apart on other occasions (İbrahim 1911, 22–3). This description indicates that 
the Muslims did not wear caps outside mosques, and let their queues hang down 
their backs.
It seems İbrahim was highly interested in queues, and asked locals the reasons for 
wearing them wherever he went, in both Beijing and Shanghai.13 He expressed his 
respect for Chinese men, for their preservation of their national culture, as seen 
in their clothes and queues (ibid., 154), comparing the situation to the Ottoman 
Empire where some people were embarrassed to wear their national fez headdress, 
and noting that Chinese people were superior to the Ottomans in that they cher-
ished their national dress (ibid., 554). Nevertheless, İbrahim was not happy that 
Chinese-speaking Muslims had queues (ibid., 512). In Beijing, he was introduced 
to a very old man by an ‘alim (i.e. a scholar, an intellectual man), when the topic of 
hairstyles came up in their conversation by chance (ibid., 565). İbrahim, after tell-
ing the old man a lot of the Hadith and teachings of Islam, advised him to shave 
his entire head, saying that anyone who was a Muslim, especially those who had 
lived long like the old man, had to assume the right attitude towards the Prophet’s 
Sunnah (i.e. deeds and sayings of Muhammad). In other words, İbrahim thought 
Muslims should cut their queues because they were against Sunnah. He stated 
that the braid grew like the tail of a mouse (ibid.). Perhaps he said this to avoid 
writing the word “pig”.
A similar description can be seen in a travel book written by Süleyman Şükrü, an 
Ottoman government official who visited China at the beginning of the twentieth 
century: he claimed that having queues was contrary to the practice of the Prophet 
12 It is said that the Muslim males’ caps derive from the Arab and Persian Muslims who came to 
China in the Tang Dynasty and became prevalent during the Yuan era (Tao 2003, 13–4). Besides 
the caps, Broomhall mentioned ahongs’ (i.e. imams’) turbans and Muslim women’s dress as well 
(Broomhall 1966, 223).
13 “A Hairless Man in China” (İbrahim 1911, 575–6), “Shanghai” (ibid., 582–4).
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Muhammad, and that Muslims should distinguish themselves from non-Mus-
lims by employing Islamic clothing and lifestyles (Şükrü 2005, 563). However, 
neither İbrahim nor Şükrü offered any clear reason for why a queue hairstyle was 
contrary to Islamic teachings. Are there any specific hairstyles that are prohibited 
for men in Islam? According to Sׅahׅīhׅ al-Bukhārī, one of the more authoritative 
Sunni Hadiths, which was edited by Abū ‘Abd Allāh Muhׅammad ibn Ismā‘īl 
al-Bukhārī (810–870), the Prophet Muhammad forbade al-qaza‘, a hairstyle in 
which one part of the hair is shaved and another is left.14 There is also a verse 
in the Qur’an which implies that Allāh prefers his believers to have their heads 
shaved and their hair kept short.15 It is unclear if İbrahim had this in mind when 
he suggested that the old man cut his queue, but it is certain that a queue looked 
extraordinary to this Russian Muslim visiting China for the first time. Although 
there are some mistakes and prejudices in ‘Âlem-i İslâm, İbrahim was allowed to 
take a good look at the Muslim community in China as a fellow believer and thus 
carefully observe local Muslims with his clear insight. His observations that many 
of the Chinese-speaking Muslims in Beijing had queues in 1909, that they tucked 
these queues into caps during worship, and that local Muslims did not care about 
his criticism of queues as “un-Islamic”, are especially interesting in light of the 
contrast with the queue-cutting movement after 1911. 
Reasons for Queue-cutting
According to Yoshizawa Seiichirō, by 1910 the Qing authorities were discuss-
ing queue-cutting. The Political Advisory Board (Ch. Zizhengyuan資政院), a 
temporary central assembly established in Beijing to prepare for constitutional 
monarchy in the late Qing Dynasty, passed a vote to abolish queues. Although 
the proposal was stopped before the Xinhai Revolution of 1911, to some extent 
queue-cutting was promoted by servicemen, students, and civilians, particularly 
by the urban elite who considered themselves to be “enlightened”. After that, 
since the revolutionary regime promoted queue-cutting, more and more people 
started to cut their queues as they followed the trend of change (Yoshizawa 
2003, 154–5).
There were three main reasons for queue-cutting. First, a queue was not com-
patible with the policy of increasing national prosperity and military power, 
because it is difficult to move one’s body with a queue. Second, foreigners de-
spised queues. Third, the Han Chinese rejected queues because they were forced 
14 Book 72 “Clothes”, No. 803 (Bukhārī 1997, 428, 429).
15 Chapter 48 Al-Fath (The Victory), Verse 27 (Ahmed Ali and Mirza 2004, 1535).
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on them by the Manchu Dynasty (ibid., 154). Muslims’ queue-cutting might be 
regarded as consistent with the general view that “the idea that the problems of 
clothing and customs were involved in the entire social order seemed to be very 
natural” (ibid., 148–9). However, as will be described later, Muslims had their 
own context within which to assert and practice queue-cutting. Therefore, this 
section reviews the Muslim debate over queue-cutting in Zhengzong Aiguobao 
(正宗愛國報) (ZhA: Genuine Patriot Daily, Beijing, 1906–1913)16 and exam-
ines the related practices. 
Starting in autumn 1910, several articles in Zhengzong Aiguobao began to discuss 
the decisions on queue-cutting and changing clothes by the Political Advisory 
Board, and the situation of queue-cutting in cities such as Beijing. Let us consider 
an article entitled “Islamic Ahongs Should Cut Queues”, reprinted in Zhengzong 
Aiguobao in November 1910 and contributed by a prominent Muslim journalist 
from Tianjin named Liu Mengyang 劉孟揚 to Minxingbao (民興報), a magazine 
which he published himself.
Our Chinese men’s queues (Ch. fabian 髪辮) and women’s foot binding 
are the things that we, Islam (Ch. Huijiao 回教, i.e. Muslims) should 
not have. It is just hard to break with [them] because they are customs. 
Despite knowing these two do not agree with Islamic teachings (Ch. 
jiaozhi 教旨), all of us Muslims (Ch. Huijiaoren 回教人) do not try to 
[stop these practices], and nobody tries to improve [these customs]. Put-
ting foot binding aside, let’s first talk about queues today. We Muslims 
treat worship as an important duty. Ablution is essential during worship, 
but these queues cause inconvenience for performing ablutions. It is not 
necessary to talk about the ordinary Muslims, but what about ahongs? 
Usually, we feel as if these queues did not exist, but we have to put them 
on the head when wearing caps and tuck them away under the caps. It 
goes without saying that these queues are unnecessary. Now the atmos-
phere (Ch. fengqi 風氣) for queue-cutting has been created. Almost every 
day, there are people who cut off their queues. I often come across such 
people. It [i.e. such a scene] is not novel at all. The weirdest thing is that 
I have never heard that those people who should never have queues have 
cut off their queues. 
16 Zhengzong Aiguobao, founded and run by a Beijing-based Muslim Ding Baochen 丁宝臣 (1876–
1913), was the first periodical published by Chinese-speaking Muslims. In this newspaper, Muslim 
contributors recorded the daily lives of Muslims and sometime expressed their opinions on various 
topics. It was widely read by Muslims in northern China, but was addressed to a wide Beijing 
audience regardless of the readers’ religious backgrounds. For more details of this newspaper, see 
Unno-Yamazaki (2016, 33–5).
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He continues:
What kind of people should not have queues? They are our Islamic ahongs. 
What ahongs preach about in the prayer hall [in mosques] is what Islam 
[i.e. Muslims] should not do. [Strangely enough] Ahongs usually prohibit 
[things against the Islamic teachings], but the only thing that ahongs 
still do not dare do is to cut off this inappropriate queue. It seems the 
queue is not in accordance with the Islamic teachings. On the 15th [of 
the month], I went to the funeral of the Zhang family who are my rela-
tives. All the close friends of mine who are also Muslims saw me with the 
queue cut off and said that it [i. e. cutting the queue] matches the creed. 
Since cutting the queue is in accordance with the Islamic teachings, not 
cutting off the queue does not match the creed. Ahongs are the people 
who are in charge of the administration of religious things. It is almost 
like they themselves are doing something against the teachings of Islam. 
In the past, there was no trend of queue-cutting, but we can no longer 
say that is true, because now the atmosphere (Ch. qifen 氣氛) has been 
created. Our Islamic ahongs, there is no obstacle to standing up together. 
Everyone, just cut them. Moreover, foreigners call our Chinese queues 
pigs’ tails (Ch. zhuweiba 猪尾巴, i.e. the tail of a pig). It is the character 
zhu 猪 [i.e. pig] which our Islam hates the most. Why do ahongs still 
have such things on their heads? Cut them immediately. (Liu 1910, 6)
To reiterate Liu’s points, the first reason he—who had already cut his queue—
called for ahongs to cut their queues is that they were a nuisance during worship, 
and it was bothersome to tuck them under caps when at prayer. This description 
reminds us of how İbrahim and Broomhall recorded the hairstyles and caps of 
Chinese-speaking Muslims. The second reason is that foreigners called queues 
pigs’ tails, which referred to a taboo in Islam. It is not difficult to imagine that 
Muslims in northern China, who repeatedly had troubles with non-Muslims over 
fake hׅalāl food and the pork taboo, and even hated homonyms that sounded like 
zhu 猪 (pigs) (Unno 2016, 16–9), strongly rejected queues knowing that foreign-
ers called them “pigs’ tails”.
It is unclear how much influence Liu Mengyang’s article had, but it was reported 
in Zhengzong Aiguobao in December 1910 that approximately forty students of 
a school named Shunzhimenwai Xiangxuetang 順治門外湘學堂, and six stu-
dents who learned Arabic in a mosque (probably located in Beijing) had cut their 
queues (Anonymous 1910). Furthermore, Wang Jingzhai 王静齋 (1879–1949), a 
prominent ahong from Tianjin, responded to Liu’s article in this manner:
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Recently, I read speech notes by Mr. Liu Mengyang, published in Tianjin 
Baihuabao.17 Its title is “Islamic Ahongs Should Cut Queues”. I cannot 
but be embarrassed when reading this, because we ahongs should ob-
serve Islamic teachings, recommend good deeds, and prevent bad deeds 
[by other Muslims]. We should not do things that disagree with Islamic 
teachings in the first place. Although these useless and harmful queues 
disagree with Islamic teachings, nevertheless, great and sophisticated 
ahongs with good reputations do not intend to cut them in general and 
even advocate [not cutting the queue]. Moreover, all of our ahongs are 
conversely advised [to cut their queues] by outsiders. The persons who 
should recommend [cutting the queue] are paradoxically advised to do so 
by other people. Isn’t that an embarrassing thing? […]
Some may say, “Although the queue should be cut off, why don’t you 
ahongs cut it?” I would say, “Among Muslims, there are many stubborn 
people (Ch. Huijiaoren duo you wangu de 回教人多有頑固的)”. Gener-
ally, they think that it is heresy to react as occasions may demand. […] 
Having a queue does not by any means agree with Islamic teachings. 
Habits and customs tend to create this sort of evil custom, which is hard 
to break with. If anyone cuts a queue, he will definitely be insulted by 
people without common sense. (Wang 1910)
Wang Jingzhai thus thought queues to be against Islam, and recommended that 
other ahongs cut them off, as Liu Mengyang did. 
Wang Jingzhai continued noting that Zhang Ziwen 張子文 (or Zhang Dechun 
張德純, 1875–1966), one of the central figures of the Beijing Muslim community 
at that time, was subjected to severe criticism when he cut off his queue in spring 
1910. 
I remember that some stubborn people (Ch. wangu dangmen 頑固
党們) severely criticized Zhang Ziwen 張子文, an ahong in Beijing 
Madian 馬甸, when he resolutely cut his queue this spring. Some say 
Mr. Zhang disregarded guocui 國粋 [i.e. the essence of the nation] (but 
having a queue disregards the Islamic teachings); others say he accom-
modates Western people (as they might not know what kind of person 
17 It cannot be confirmed whether this article was reprinted in Tianjin Baihuabao, since the only back 
numbers currently available are from No. 80 (published on 10 April 1910) to No. 254 (1 October 
1910). Still, judging from the title, author, and contents, this article should be the same as the one 
that was written by Liu Mengyang, originally published in Minxingbao, and later reprinted in 
Zhengzong Aiguobao on November 29, 1910 with the title “Islamic Ahongs Should Cut Queues”. 
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the Prophet Muhammad was). Eventually, they nicknamed him Monk 
Zhangsi (Ch. Zhangsi heshang 張四和尚). […] The funniest thing is 
that, even though the tops of the queues of some aged, virtuous elder 
ahongs (Ch. niangao youde de lao ahongmen 年高有德的老阿衡們) are 
not as big as copper coins, whether they are old or young, they hate to 
cut them off. Isn’t it funny? Great, respectable and sophisticated ahongs 
with reputations, I respectfully recommend you to cut your queues im-
mediately. I say only once. Don’t make people laugh when they see your 
heads, ha, ahongs. (Wang 1910)
Considering that most of the articles advocating queue-cutting in Zhengzong Ai-
guobao were published after autumn 1910, Zhang Ziwen would have been one of 
the earliest Muslims in Beijing to cut off his queue. This episode provides us with 
valuable information about what those Muslims who were against queue-cutting, 
who were often called “stubborn people” and whose opinions were seldom includ-
ed in the Muslim press, were actually thinking. It is notable that Wang Jingzhai 
intentionally made fun of the “aged, virtuous elder ahongs” who had not cut off 
their queues yet, which implies that there was a generational gap between older 
and younger ahongs over whether or not to cut the queue.  
Two more things can be identified from the above quotation that explain many 
Muslims’ disagreement with queue-cutting. First, these Muslims opposed 
queue-cutting because they did not want to look like Buddhist monks. The word 
“heshang” literally means a Buddhist monk, and Buddhist monks were exempted 
from the queue and shaved all of their hair.18 The expression “Zhangsi heshang”,19 
which was used to ridicule Zhang Ziwen, thus implied that he was no longer a 
Muslim, which would have been an unbearable insult as he was a devoted Muslim. 
It is therefore interesting that both Muslims in favour of and against queue-cutting 
were afraid that others would see them as non-Muslims. Second, the above quota-
tion reveals that the “stubborn people” criticized Zhang Ziwen’s queue-cutting for 
the lack of guocui 國粋. This word originally referred to Japanese nationalism ( Ja. 
kokusui 国粋), which harshly criticized Westernisation and encouraged the Japa-
nese to cherish their own history and culture under the sovereignty of the Emperor. 
The terminology was invented by a Japanese intellectual and politician named Shi-
ga Shigetaka 志賀重昂 (1863–1927) and rapidly spread during the Meiji era. This 
concept was borrowed by Chinese intellectuals, yet developed in a different way 
in China where the revolutionaries used it not to support the Qing Dynasty, but 
18 Besides Buddhist monks, men in mourning, young boys, and Taoist priests (who let their hair 
grow) were exempted from having the queue (Rhoads 2000, 60).
19 The number si (four) is from his paihang 排行, or seniority in age within one family generation. 
22 Noriko Unno-Yamazaki: Cutting off the Queue for Faith...
instead to oppose it.20 The word guocui in Wang’s article can be translated simply as 
“nationalism”, or can be understood as “the national essence” if we assume that the 
author considered the queue a national symbol of China. 
In this article, Wang Jingzhai introduced two episodes in the Arabic scriptures to 
explain the reasons Muslims must not keep their queues. The first story was about 
a man who had his hair cut but left half of it long after the Prophet Muhammad 
had passed away. Abū Bakr ‘Abd Allāh ibn Abī Quhׅāfah al-Sׅiddīq (573–634), 
a senior companion of Muhammad and the first Muslim Caliph, “thought this 
hairstyle to be against Islamic teachings” and chopped the man’s head off. The 
second episode involved an Islamic leader putting a man to the sword for saying 
that he did not like the cropped hairstyle which Muhammad favoured (Wang 
1910). Leaving the veracity of these episodes aside, what should be emphasised 
is that both Liu and Wang recommended that other Muslims cut their queues 
on the grounds that they were contrary to Islamic teachings, while non-Muslims 
were being told to cut their queues to increase national prosperity, military power, 
and free themselves from Manchu rule. This fact indicates that Chinese-speaking 
Muslims did not always act in accordance with the slogan, Aiguo aijiao (“to love 
one’s homeland is to love faith”).  
In other words, contrary to non-Muslims’ queue-cutting movement, which was 
motivated by anti-Qing sentiment and patriotism, for Muslims queue-cutting 
was also a matter of religious belief. Perhaps for that reason, Zhengzong Aiguobao 
had few descriptions of Confucian ethics, while the non-Muslim urban elite in 
the late Qing period tended to discuss the pros and cons of queue-cutting in light 
of Confucian values, arguing that “to cut a queue is to hurt the body given by 
one’s parents. It is unfavourable because it is against the ethics of filial piety (Ch. 
xiao 孝)” (Yoshizawa 2003, 148). Also: “A queue is a hairstyle that shaves more 
than half of the hair, so it is against the teachings of Confucius” (ibid.). Moreover, 
though non-Muslims hated queues because they were a custom of Manchu rulers 
and seen as “barbarian (Ch. yi 夷)”, it is likely that Muslims avoided discussing 
the “barbarism” of queues. This does not mean that anti-Manchu sentiment did 
not exist among Chinese-speaking Muslims during the Qing rule over China.21 
Nonetheless, as far as the Muslim elites in Beijing and Tianjin in the early twenti-
eth century were concerned, they were reluctant to take a hostile attitude towards 
Manchus, although they were not altogether pro-Manchu.
20 For further studies on the guocui movement in modern China in relation to Japan, see Kawakami 
(2001) and Han (2015).
21 Atwill (2005, 139) has pointed out that Du Wenxiu 杜文秀, who was the leader of the Panthay Re-
bellion in Yunnan, was not targeting the Han Chinese. Rather, he had anti-Qing and anti-Manchu 
sentiments and wanted to destroy the Manchu government.
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Difficulties of Queue-cutting
We do not know how ordinary Muslims reacted to the reports that Liu Meng-
yang, an eminent journalist, and Zhang Ziwen, who had great influence on Mus-
lim communities in northern China, had cut their queues. In any case, the sit-
uation greatly changed from the time when Abdürreşid İbrahim had recorded 
Muslims’ queue hairstyle in 1909, as queue-cutting became a mainstream practice 
by the second half of 1911. 
The names and occupations of people who cut their queues in Beijing and Tianjin 
were listed in Zhengzong Aiguobao, although it was not shown whether they were 
Muslims or not. At the same time, the discussions on queue-cutting by the Polit-
ical Advisory Board were often reported, and several articles on the pros and cons 
of queue-cutting were published in the newspaper. Some Chinese were worried 
that it would be difficult to find jobs if one rushed to change one’s hair and style 
of clothing (Mengdie 1911). Still, the Zhengzong Aiguobao favoured articles that 
recommended queue-cutting as soon as possible, saying, for example, “Chinese 
people’s queues are ridiculed by foreigners” (Letian 1911), or “[a queue] looks 
good only because we are used to it” (Xinmin 1912). It is difficult to check the 
names of the contributors or whether the authors of these articles were Muslims 
because they used pennames. Nevertheless, it can be safely assumed that Zheng-
zong Aiguobao took a positive attitude towards queue-cutting, and the opposing 
view was seldom presented in the newspaper. 
Notably, a short article was published in Zhengzong Aiguobao on January 2, 1912, 
right after the establishment of the Republic of China, saying that a Muslim 
hair-cutting comrade association had been founded in the Qianmen area in Bei-
jing (Anonymous 1912a). It reported that some members would soon organize a 
hair cutting group for Muslims, and that it would be located inside the seventh 
primary school for the learning of Islam and Confucianism in Qianmenwai Pu-
chenshi (Ch. Qianmenwai Puchenshi jingru diqi xiaoxuetang 前門外鋪陳市經儒
第七小學堂). This organization’s goals and practices are not totally clear, but it 
seems that they promoted the slogan “freedom of haircut (Ch. ziyou jianfa 自由
剪髪)” and queue-cutting by Muslims. 
The queue-cutting movement continued for a while, even after the establishment 
of the Republic of China. Several lists of the names of people who cut their queues 
in Beijing were published in Zhengzong Aiguobao through 1912. Not all of these 
were necessarily Muslims, but it would not be surprising if some of them were 
Muslims. We can see that queue-cutting had reached across generations from the 
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fact that the name of a 10-year-old was listed (Anonymous 1912b).22 Pro-queue-
cutting articles also continued to be published: “The number of queue-cutting 
people has been increasing day by day. Not only people in academia, politics or 
military, but also those engaged in business know the benefits of queue-cutting 
very well” (Baofa xingwuzi 1912). Moreover, an article also said: “Cut queues im-
mediately, or it will be too late when you really have troubles” (ibid.). There must 
have been Muslims who were encouraged to cut their queues by these words rath-
er than by patriotism or faith. In other words, as is discussed in Liu Mengyang’s 
article above, it was also the social atmosphere of the times, in which people had 
already cut their queues, that made Muslims cut their hair.
Nonetheless, it was true that a certain number of people in Beijing chose not to 
cut their queues, even when eighty or ninety percent of the population had already 
done so in Nanjing, which later became the capital of the Republic of China 
(Yoshizawa 2003, 145). As Cheng (1998, 135) noted, “As the queue-cutting issue 
was related to the conflict between the new and old forces and ideologies, it gave 
rise to many disturbances and incidents of unrest around the country.”  There were 
also a certain number of Muslims who were against queue-cutting. Let us take 
a look at an article entitled “Describing the Reasons Why Our Ahongs Never 
Advocate Cutting Queues” (Anonymous 1912c), presenting an opposing view 
to the article that announced the foundation of the Muslim queue-cutting com-
rade association. The author of this article, who called himself jiaoshi 教師 (i.e. 
ahong) and xiaosheng 小生 (i.e. my humble self ), and was called gexia 閣下 (i.e. 
his Excellency) by other Muslims, spoke out on the difficulties of recommending 
queue-cutting to anti-queue-cutting Muslims in Tianjin. 
The author thought that the queue was neat and clean, saying that the hairstyle 
was the essence of the nation (Ch. guocui 國粋), something which only Chinese 
people have in this world. At the same time, he wanted to cut his own queue, 
because he thought that the old customs should be removed along with the old 
regime when it was gone. He also believed that, even though the queues did not 
contravene Islamic teachings, “they were opposite to the deeds of the Prophet 
Muhammad” (Anonymous 1912c, 5), as they were annoying during worship, and 
it was more convenient if they cut them. He agreed with Liu Mengyang’s opin-
ion that queues were against Islamic doctrine, and was very dissatisfied with the 
behaviour of the ahongs in Tianjin who did not follow Liu Mengyang’s proposal 
of cutting them off. However, the author eventually gave up on the plan of cutting 
his own queue because of the opposition of ordinary Muslims. As he stated, it was 
not until the author became an ahong himself that he became aware that some 
22 A similar list can be seen in No. 2051, published the next day. 
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Muslims were so stubborn that they had the power to give ahongs trouble. Young 
ahongs such as he were not powerful enough to urge such stubborn people to cut 
their queues. He suggested that, if an old custom, like the queue hairstyle, did 
not disrespect Islamic teachings, then ahongs should not pay too much attention 
to it and should refrain from prohibiting it immediately to avoid resistance from 
Muslims and save faces (Ch. bao timian 保體面).
It is difficult to identify the author of this article, because it is impossible to check 
the original text in Tianjin Baihuabao (天津白話報). But, judging from the con-
text, he was an ahong based in Tianjin who had expressed his agreement with Liu 
Mengyang’s argument on queue-cutting. If so, it is probably safe to say that Wang 
Jingzhai, about 30 years old, was the author who contributed this article to support 
Liu. If what is stated in this article is true, anti-queue-cutting Muslims were so per-
sistent in Tianjin that ahongs could not persuade them otherwise. It can thus easily 
be imagined that there was severe friction between them and pro-queue-cutting 
Muslims. It is surprising that the author, i.e. Wang Jingzhai, who supported Liu 
Mengyang, eventually decided not to cut off his queue, even though he thought 
that the queues were against the teaching of the Prophet Muhammad. As a young 
Muslim who had just became an ahong, Wang Jingzhai could only compromise to 
avoid the resistance of “stubborn” older Muslims and save face (Ch. bao timian 保體
面), and took a wait-and-see attitude, trying to be neutral and flexible. 
Here, I would like to focus on the word timian 體面, one of those that can be 
translated as “face” in a sociological context and idiomatically refers to an individ-
ual’s public self-image based on her/his own sense of dignity or prestige (Goffman 
1967, 5). This term, which thought to have its origin in the Chinese language (Ho 
1976, 867), is regarded as “the principle of the Chinese spirit” (Lu 1959, 129) and 
“the most delicate standard by which Chinese social intercourse is regulated” (Lin 
1935, 200). I am not aiming to simplify the history of Chinese-speaking Muslims, 
yet it seems that their guiding principles have aspects that can be understood with 
the concept of face. The episode of the young ahong in Tianjin, probably Wang 
Jingzhai, shows us that saving face was his motivation for acting to preserve the 
queue. He wanted to cut off his queue because of his faith in Islam, but preserved 
it to save face. Also, instead of persisting in his belief that the queue was against 
the teachings of the Prophet, he chose to keep his queue for the long-term aim 
of not provoking conflicts among Muslims. In other words, keeping a queue was 
wrong according to the regulations of Islam. However, by doing so, Wang was 
trying to pacify the anti-queue-cutting Muslims and preserve stability and har-
mony among the Muslim community in Tianjin. The tension between religious 
faith and social face may, to some extent, thus help us to understand the real-life 
practices of Islam in China and Muslims’ interactions with others. 
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Conclusion
In order to deconstruct the nationalism of Chinese-speaking Muslims, which 
has often been overemphasised in previous studies, this article has shown 
that Chinese-speaking Muslims were also upset by queues and tormented by 
what was called hair disaster (Ch. fa’e 髪厄) or hair wickedness (Ch. fahuo 髪
禍) (Kuwabara 1927, 332). Unlike non-Muslim Chinese men who cut their 
braids because of anti-Manchu sentiment and nationalistic feelings, some 
Muslims cut theirs off for religious reasons, as they claimed that the hairstyle 
was un-Islamic and contrary to the practices of the Prophet, making the fol-
lowing claims: queues are bothersome when one performs worship; they look 
like pigs’ tails, which should be avoided in Islam; the Prophet Muhammad 
liked a close-cropped hairstyle; and his companion disliked a hairstyle which 
was shaved halfway. Still, a certain number of Muslims tried to preserve their 
queues. Their opposition was so intense that a young Muslim scholar in Tian-
jin abandoned cutting off his queue to prevent conflicts among the community 
and save his face. 
To be sure, as previous research has pointed out, during the Qing Dynasty hair 
was “a means of social control and a focus of cultural and political conflict” (Cheng 
1998, 138) and “hair needs to be interpreted as a public symbol” (Godley 1994, 
53): “for Han Chinese, the queue hair style embodied the alien conquest, the pow-
er of autocracy, and the downfall of traditional rites and cultural pride” (Cheng 
1998, 128). However, in the limited case of the Muslim elite in the urban areas of 
Beijing and Tianjin, queue-cutting was discussed in terms of their inner religious 
beliefs rather than political issues. In other words, they interpreted the queue-cut-
ting movement in modern China, a symbolic form of social activism of the Xinhai 
Revolution and one of the most influential events in the modern history of East 
Asia followed by the collapse of the Qing Dynasty and the establishment of the 
new Republican regime, in their own context. 
As Christian missionaries witnessed and reported, Chinese-speaking Muslims 
tucked away their queues and concealed them under their caps in the early twen-
tieth century. Some also cut off the queues, as Muslims themselves described, 
because it was troublesome to hide them under their caps. It is also possible that 
they did not want to leave their “un-Islamic” queues hanging down their backs 
during worship. Muslims’ attitudes toward the queue-hairstyle remind us of what 
Marshall Broomhall recorded about their “compromise”, by which they pretended 
to pray to idols or the Imperial Tablet (Ch. wansui paizi 萬歳牌子), which had to 
be placed into each mosque.
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Their [i.e. Muslims’] attitudes as students or as officials towards the wor-
ship of the Emperor and of Confucius, or even of idolatry, is that of com-
promise. Compelled by law to conform, they excuse themselves by saying 
that they only do so outwardly and not in heart. (Broomhall 1966, 228)
Certainly, Muslims’ efforts for national integration and patriotism, as symbolised 
by the slogan Aiguo aijiao (“to love one’s homeland is to love faith”) and even the 
title of the newspaper Zhengzong Aiguobao (lit. Genuine Patriot Daily), which this 
article has mainly drawn on, were significant throughout the twentieth century. 
However, at the same time, attention should also be paid to their everyday “com-
promise” with what Broomhall called “an empty official ceremony” (ibid.). For 
them, the queue must have been another one of these, as it embodied the reality of 
the obligation to accept “pagan” rule, whether from the Manchus or Han Chinese. 
This may explain why the Muslim elite did not express anti-Manchu sentiment. 
While the Han Chinese were liberated from the Manchu rule and enjoyed free-
dom of hairstyle under the government dominated by the Han Chinese, the birth 
of a new regime meant that Muslims again had to seek ways to construct a stable 
relationship with the un-Islamic, “heathen” government.
References
Ahmed Ali, S. V, and Mirza Mahdi Pooya. 2004. The Holy Qur’an: Arabic Text 
with English Translation and Commentary. 4th ed. Elmhurst: Tahrike Tar-
sile Qur’an, Inc.
Anonymous. 1910. “Jian bianzi 剪辮子 (Cutting the Queue).” Zhengzong Aiguo-
bao 正宗愛國報 1437, December 10, 2010.
Anonymous. 1912a. “Ji qingzhen jianfa tongzhihui 紀清真剪髪同志會 (Re-
cording the Islamic Hair Cutting Group).” Zhengzong Aiguobao 正宗愛國報 
1813, January 2, 1912.
Anonymous. 1912b. “Jianfa yizhi 剪髪彙誌 (Note on Queue-cutting).” Zheng-
zong Aiguobao 正宗愛國報 2050, September 5, 1912.
Anonymous. 1912c. “Lügao: Shu wo huijiaoshi bukeng xieli tichang jianfa zhi yu-
anyin 録稿: 述我回教師不肯竭力提唱剪髪之原因 (Lü Tianjin Baihuabao 
録天津白話報) (Reported: Describing the Reasons Why Our Ahongs Never 
Advocate Cutting Queues (published in Tianjin Baihuabao).” Zhengzong Ai-
guobao 正宗愛國報 1813, January 2, 1912.
Atwill, David G. 2005. The Chinese Sultanate: Islam, Ethnicity, and the Panthay 
Rebellion in Southwest China, 1856–1873. Stanford: Stanford University 
Press.
28 Noriko Unno-Yamazaki: Cutting off the Queue for Faith...
Baofa xingwuzi 保髪醒悟子. 1912. “Laigao: Quan jianfa qianshuo 來稿: 勧剪髪
浅説 (Contribution: A Shallow Discussion on Recommending Haircuts).” 
Zhengzong Aiguobao 正宗愛國報 2050, September 5, 1912.
Broomhall, Marshall. 1966 (1910). Islam in China: A Neglected Problem. New York: 
Paragon Book Reprint Corp.
Bukhārī, Muhׅammad ibn Ismā‘īl. 1997. Sׅahׅīhׅ al- Bukhārī: The Translation of the 
Meanings of Sahih al- Bukhārī: Arabic-English. Translated by Muhammad 
Muhsin Khan, vol. 7. Riyadh: Dar-us-Salam Publications.
Chen, Xiaohu, ed. 2011. Huizu yu xinhai geming 回族與辛亥革命 (Huizu and 
Xinhai Revolution). Yinchuan: Ningxia renmin chubanshe.
Cheng, Weikun. 1998. “Politics of the Queue: Agitation and Resistance in the 
Beginning and End of Qing China.” In Hair: Its Power and Meaning in Asian 
Cultures, edited by Albany Alif Hiltebeitel et al., 123–42. New York: State 
University of New York Press.
Dillon, Michael. 1999. China’s Muslim Hui Community: Migration, Settlement and 
Sects. London: Curzon Press.
Godley, Michael R. 1994. “The End of the Queue: Hair as Symbol in Chinese 
History.” East Asian History 8: 53–72.
Goffman, Erving. 1967. Interaction Ritual: Essays in Face-to-Face Behavior. Gar-
den City: Anchor.
Han, Zhao 韓釗. 2015. “Shinmatsu chūgoku ni okeru ‘kokusui undō’ to ‘kokug-
aku’ gainen no sōsei: ‘kokusui ha’ tō jitsu wo chūshin ni 清末中国における
「国粋運動」と「国学」概念：「国粋派」鄧実を中心に (The ‘Guocui’ 
Movement and the Creation of the Concept of ‘Guoxue’ in the Late Qing 
China: With a Focus on an ‘Ultranationalist’ Deng-Shi).” Ajia taihēyō ken-
kyūka ronshū アジア太平洋研究科論集 30: 153–75.
Hastings, James, John Alexander Selbie, and Louis Herbert Gray. 1916. Ency-
clopædia of Religion and Ethics, vol. 8. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 
Ho, David Yau-Fai. 1976. “On the Concept of Face.” American Journal of Sociology 
81 (4): 867–84.
Hou, Jie, and Hu Wei 侯傑 胡偉. 2005. “Tifa, xufa, jianfa: qingdai bianfa de shen-
ti zhengzhishi yanjiu 剃髪、蓄髪、剪髪：清代辮髪的身体政治史研究 
(Hair-Cutting, Hair-Wearing, and Braid-Cutting: Studies on a Body-Poli-
tics History of Hair and Braid in Qing Dynasty).” Xueshu yuekan 學術月刊 
10: 79–88.
İbrahim, Abdürreşid. 1911. ‘Âlem-i İslâm ve Japonya’da İntişâr-ı İslâmiyet (The 
World of Islam and the Difussion of Islam in Japan), vol. 1. İstanbul: Ahׅmed 
Sâkׅî Bey Matׅba‘ası. 
29Asian Studies VI (XXII), 1 (2018), pp. 11–31
Kawakami, Norimasa 川上哲正. 2001. “Shingai kakumeiki ni okeru kokusui shu-
gi to kindai shigaku: nihon kindai tono kōsa no shiten kara 辛亥革命期にお
ける国粋主義と近代史学：日本近代との交差の視点から (Nationalism 
and Modern Historical Studies at the Time of the Xinhai Revolution).” Tōyō 
bunka kenkyū 東洋文化研究 3: 1–24.
Ko, Dorothy. 1997. “The Body as Attire: The Shifting Meanings of Footbinding 
in Seventeenth-Century China.” Journal of Women’s History 8 (4): 8–27.
–––. 2002. Every Step a Lotus: Shoes for Bound Feet. Berkely: University of Califor-
nia Press.
Kuhn, Philip. 1990. Soulstealers: The Chinese Sorcery Scare of 1768. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press.
Kuwabara, Jitsuzō 桑原隲蔵. 1927. Tōyōshi zeien 東洋史説苑 (Historical Stories of 
Oriental History). Tōkyō: Kōbundō shobō 弘文堂書房.
Legge, James. 1881. The Religions of China: Confucianism and Tâoism Described and 
Compared with Christianity. New York: Scribner.
Letian 楽天. 1911. “Yanshuo: Fabian de guanxi 演説: 髪辮的関係 (Speech: Re-
garding Queue-cutting).” Zhengzong Aiguobao 正宗愛國報 1809, December 
29, 1911.
Lin, Yutang. 1935. My Country and My People. New York: Reynal & Hitchcock.
Lipman, Jonathan. 2004. “White Hats, Oil Cakes, and Common Blood.” In Gov-
erning China’s Multiethnic Frontiers, edited by Morris Rossabi, 19–52. Seattle: 
University of Washington Press.
–––. 2006. “‘A Fierce and Brutal People’: On Islam and Muslims in Qing Law.” In 
Empire at the Margins: Culture, Ethnicity, and Frontier in Early Modern China, 
edited by Pamela Crossely, Helen Siu, and Donald Sutton, 83–112. Berkeley: 
University of California Press.
Liu, Mengyang. 劉孟揚. 1910. “Lügao: Huijiao Ahong yingdang jianfa 録稿: 回教
阿衡應當剪髪（録民興報） (Islamic Ahongs Should Cut Off Their Queues: 
Reprinted from Minxingbao).” Zhengzong Aiguobao 1426, November 29, 1910.
Lu, Xun 魯迅. 1959. “Shuo mianzi 説面子 (On Face).” Selected Works of Lu Xun, vol. 4. 
Translated by Yang Xianyi and Gladys Yang. Peking: Foreign Language Press. 
Ma, Haiyun. 2006. “Patriotic and Pious Muslim Intellectuals in Modern China: 
The Case of Ma Jian.” American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 23 (3): 54–70.
Matsumoto, Masumi 松本ますみ. 2003. “Chūgoku no isurāmu shinbunka undō: 
Musurimu mainoriti no ikinokori senryaku 中国のイスラーム新文化運
動：ムスリム・マイノリティの生き残り戦略 (The New Cultural Move-
ment of Islam in China: The Survival Strategy of a Muslim Minority).” In 
Gendai isurāmu shisō to seiji undō 現代イスラーム思想と政治運動 (Islamic 
Thoughts Today and Political Movements), edited by Yasushi Kosugi and Hisao 
Komatsu, 141–65. Tōkyō: Tōkyō daigaku shuppankai 東京大学出版会. 
30 Noriko Unno-Yamazaki: Cutting off the Queue for Faith...
––––. 2006. “Rationalizing Patriotism among Muslim Chinese: The Impact of 
the Middle East on the Yuehua Journal.” In Intellectuals in the Modern Is-
lamic World: Transmission, Transformation and Communication, edited by 
Stéphane Dudoignon, Hisao Komatsu, and Yasushi Kosugi, 117–42. Lon-
don: Routledge.
Mengdie 夢蝶. 1911. “Jianfa zhi nan 剪髪之難 (The Difficulties of Haircut).” 
Zhengzong Aiguobao 正宗愛國報 1802, December 22, 1911.
Metzger, Sean. 2014. Chinese Looks: Fashion, Performance, Race. Bloomington: In-
diana University Press.
Millward, James. 1998. Beyond the Pass: Economy, Ethnicity, and Empire in Qing 
Central Asia, 1759–1864. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Mochida, Yōhei 持田洋平. 2012. “Shingapōru kajin shakai no ‘kindai’ no hajimari 
ni kansuru ikkōsatsu: Rin bunkei to benpatsu setsujo katsudō wo chūshin ni 
シンガポール華人社会の｢近代｣の始まりに関する一考察: 林文慶と辮
髪切除活動を中心に (Reconsidering the Beginning of the ‘Modern Era’ of 
the Singapore Chinese Society: Lim Boon Keng and Queue-cutting Activ-
ism. 1898–1899).” Kakyō kajin kenkyū 華僑華人研究 9: 7–27.
Rhoads, Edward J. M. 2000. Manchus and Han: Ethnic Relations and Political Pow-
er in Late Qing and Early Republican China, 1861–1928. Seattle: University 
of Washington Press.
Ryū, Kaori 劉香織. 1990. Danpatsu: Kindai higashi ajia no bunka shōtotsu 断髪：
近代東アジアの文化衝突 (Cutting Hair off: Cultural Clashes in Modern East 
Asia). Tōkyō: Asahi Shinbunsha 朝日新聞社.
Şükrü, Karçınzade Süleyman. 2005 (1907). Seyâhׅatü’l-Kübrâ/Büyük Seyahat 
(Ground Tour). Eğirdir: Eğirdir Belediyesi.
Tao, Hong 陶紅. 2003. Huizu fushi wenhua 回族服飾文化 (The Fashion Cultures 
of Huizu). Yinchuan: Ningxia renmin chubanshe 寧夏人民出版社.
Tejapira, Kasian. 1992. “Pigtail: A Pre-History of Chineseness in Siam.” Sojourn 
7: 95–122.
Unno, Noriko 海野典子. 2015. “Benpatsu wa han isurāmu teki ka?: Nijussei-
ki shotō no ‘senpatsu’ būmu ni miru kahoku musurimu shakai no shosō 辮
髪は反イスラーム的か? : 20世紀初頭の「剪髪」ブームに見る華北ム
スリム社会の諸相 (Is the Queue Hairstyle Un-Islamic? : An Analysis of 
Muslim Communities in North China with a Focus on the Queue-Cutting 
Movement in the Early Twentieth Century).” Ajia chīki bunka kenkyū アジア
地域文化研究 12: 51–73.
–––. 2016. “Chūgoku musurimu no ‘seishin’ ishiki to jita ninshiki: Nijusseiki shotō 
no kahoku chīki ni okeru harāru mondai to ‘kai’ ‘kan’ kankei 中国ムスリムの
「清真」意識と自他認識：20世紀初頭の華北地域におけるハラール
問題と「回」「漢」関係 (The “Qingzhen” Consciousness and Self-Other 
31Asian Studies VI (XXII), 1 (2018), pp. 11–31
Recognition of Chinese Muslims: The Halal Question and “Hui”-“Han” Re-
lations in North China in the Early Twentieth Century).” Journal of Islamic 
Area Studies イスラーム地域研究ジャーナル 8: 12–24.
Unno-Yamazaki, Noriko 海野（山﨑）典子. 2016. “Under Crescent and Full 
Moons: Contradiction and Coherence of Muslims in Beijing 1906–1913.” 
PhD Dissertation. The University of Tokyo.
Wakeman, Frederick E. Jr. 1975. “Localism and Loyalism during the Ch’ing Con-
quest of Kiangnan.” In Conflict and Control in Late Imperial China, edited by 
Frederick E. Jr. Wakeman and Carolyn Grant, 43–85. Berkeley: University of 
California Press.
–––. 1985. The Great Enterprise: The Manchu Reconstruction of Imperial Order in 
Seventeenth-Century China. vol, 1. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Wang, Jianping. 2001. A Glossary of Chinese Islamic Terms. Richmond: Curzon 
Press.
Wang, Jingzhai. 1910. “Du Huijiao ahong yingdang jianfa zhi yanshuo yougan 
讀回教阿衡應當剪髪之演説有感 (Impressions after Reading the Article 
about How Islamic Ahongs Should Cut Queues).” Zhengzong Aiguobao 正宗
愛國報 1440, December 23, 1910.
Xinmin 新民. 1912. “Yanshuo: Jianbian bu yifu 演説: 剪辮不易服 (Speech: Cut-
ting a Queue, Not Changing Clothes).” Zhengzong Aiguobao 正宗愛國報 
1812, January 1, 1912.
Yamazaki, Noriko. 2014. “Abdürreşid İbrahim’s Journey to China: Muslim Com-
munities in the Late Qing as Seen by a Russian-Tatar Intellectual.” Central 
Asian Survey 33 (3): 405–20.
Yoshizawa, Seiichirō 吉澤誠一郎. 2003. Aikokushugi no sōsei: Nashonarizumu kara 
kindai chūgoku wo miru 愛国主義の創成：ナショナリズムから近代中国
をみる (Creation of Aiguo zhuyi: Modern China from the Perspective of Nation-
alism). Tōkyō: Iwanami shoten 岩波書店.
